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ABSTRACT:  In  order  to  reduce  the 
exchange-rate  risk,  banks  in  emerging 
markets  are  typically  denominating  their 
loans  in  foreign  currencies.  However,  in 
the event of a substantial depreciation of 
the  local  currency,  the  payment  ability 
of  a  foreign-currency  borrower  may  be 
reduced significantly, exposing the lender to 
additional default risk. This paper analyses 
how  the  exchange-rate  risk  of  foreign-
currency loans spills over into default risk. 
We show that in an economy where foreign-
currency loans are a dominant source of 
financing  economic  activity,  depreciation 
of the local currency establishes a negative 
feedback mechanism that leads to higher 
default probabilities, reduced credit supply, 
and reduced growth. This finding has some 
important  implications  that  may  be  of 
special interest for regulators and market 
participants in emerging economies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The growing globalisation of capital markets made economies more reliant on 
foreign finance. Companies are increasing their international presence in order 
to improve their investment opportunities and diversify their assets. Similarly, 
banks  and  other  financial  institutions  are  borrowing  and  investing  beyond 
national borders. 
Today, on average, 40 to 45 percent of bank deposits in Emerging Europe, Latin 
America and the Middle East are denominated in or indexed to a foreign currency 
(International Monetary Fund, 2004). Patterns of such direct or indirect currency 
substitution, commonly known as “dollarisation”, are highly uneven: in some 
countries (e.g., Uruguay, Lebanon and Croatia) foreign-currency deposits greatly 
exceed domestic currency deposits, while in others (e.g., Brazil) their share is 
zero because banking legislation does not permit the holding of foreign-currency 
deposits.1 
In the event of domestic currency devaluation, the right-hand sides of banks’ 
balance sheets would be greatly inflated if the foreign-currency liabilities were 
dominant. In order to reduce the exchange-rate risk of their balance sheets, banks 
in many emerging markets hold a significant fraction of their assets in loans that 
are pegged to a „hard currency”. Thus, most local foreign-currency deposits are 
offset by domestic foreign-currency loans, not by assets held abroad. As a result, 
the banking sectors’ net foreign asset positions are typically positive but close to 
balance. From the point of view of the market risk department, currency risk is 
fully hedged in this way, since the exchange-rate exposure of assets approximately 
covers the exchange-rate exposure of liabilities. In addition, as Galai and Wiener 
(2009) show, foreign-currency borrowing may be cheaper when the exchange rate 
is positively correlated with the return on assets. In this way, dollarisation of 
placements also helps to reduce the costs of their financing. 
Another aspect of dollarisation is that it allows the banking system to be the 
source of large foreign-currency liquidity needs in times of crisis. Large liquid 
1  Dollarisation of liabilities is typical for economies whose trade is dominated by imports. 
Within the European Union, there are monetary independent countries that have a trade 
deficit with the Eurozone, such as Hungary, where dollarisation seems natural. On the other 
hand, in export-oriented emerging markets foreign currency-denominated liabilities are 
scarce. This is the case with the Czech Republic, whose 2008 trade balance surplus with the 
Eurozone was around 3 billion Euros with an increasing tendency, leading to a very stable 
Czech Koruna.34
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foreign-currency assets can increase the resilience of dollarised banking systems 
both because they may be a source of emergency liquidity, and because these 
assets typically continue to perform in the event of moderate domestic shocks.
Exchange rate hedging through foreign currency-denomination of assets therefore 
seems straightforward and natural. However, such reasoning implicitly assumes 
that borrowers continue to service their debt obligations independently of the 
exchange rate volatility, i.e. that exchange rate fluctuations do not impact credit 
risk. In the case of small exchange rate moves such an assumption generally holds: 
for example, borrowers usually prefer not to default on their mortgage payments 
unless absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, in the event of a large exchange rate 
adjustment, this may not be true. Indeed, most individual borrowers have a 
stream of income that remains relatively stable in domestic currency. That implies 
that their obligations, expressed in terms of domestic currency, may significantly 
increase while their ability to pay may stay the same or even diminish. This is a 
mechanism by which exchange-rate risk gets transmitted into credit risk. 
In this paper, we focus on the mechanisms and consequences of interaction 
between exchange rate and credit risk. In particular, we study how the likelihood 
of default of a foreign-currency borrower may substantially increase in the case 
of a significant depreciation of the local currency. We explore how the increased 
default risk feeds back, negatively, into the supply of credit in the economy. As 
we will show, this leads to a reduction of growth and initiates a new wave of 
procyclical defaults.
In financial literature, the issue of the currency structure of loans is usually 
analysed from the point of view of the borrower. A common approach used by 
academics and policy-makers is to focus on the mismatch between the currency 
composition  of  assets  and  liabilities  held  by  corporations  and  sovereigns.  A 
significant  number  of  papers  show  that  currency  mismatch  is  an  important 
factor in financial crises, particularly in developing economies.2 This paper rather 
concentrates on the implications that reduction in the payment ability of foreign-
currency borrowers may have on the entire financial system. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops a model 
of interaction between the exchange rate and default risk. Section 3 discusses 
2  See, for example, Gibson and Sundaresan (2001), Catao and Sutton (2002), Duffie, Pedersen, 
and Singleton (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005), Weigel and Gemmill (2006), 
Chan-Lau and Santos (2006), Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007), and Longstaff et al. (2007).Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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the model equilibrium and explains how currency risk spills over into default 
risk, creating a negative feedback effect. Our results reinvigorate the notion that 
in emerging markets an appropriate risk measure should integrate exchange 
rate  and  credit  risk.  This  has  important  implications  for  regulators  and  the 
financial industry, especially in small emerging economies. These implications 
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the propositions are 
given in the Appendix.
2. THE MODEL
Ever since the pioneering work of Robert Merton (1974), there has been a substantial 
number of publications on various issues related to credit risk modelling (see 
Duffie and Singleton, 2003, or Capuano et al., 2009, for a review of credit risk 
models). Far less effort, however, has been dedicated to the interaction of credit 
and market risk and, in particular, to the interaction of credit and exchange rate 
risk. One of the first models of credit and market risk interaction can be found 
in Jarrow and Turnbull (2000). This paper studied the interaction of credit and 
interest rate risk. More recently, Alessandri and Drehmann (2007), among others, 
have focused on the issue of whether separate estimation of market and credit risk, 
which is currently a standard banking practice, under or overestimates the total 
risk. Breuer et al. (2008) compare regulatory capital based on integrated credit 
and exchange-rate modelling with the sum of the regulatory capital when credit 
and exchange-rate risk are treated separately. Using econometric methods of 
Pesaran et al. (2000) and Pesaran et al. (2006), they find that required regulatory 
capital for Swiss Franc-denominated loans in a stylized Austrian bank may be 
significantly underestimated if credit and currency risks are considered to be 
independent.
In this paper, the transfer of currency into credit risk is modelled within the 
framework of a financial market in a partial equilibrium setup with rational 
expectations. The economy lives for one period, between dates 0 and 1. The 
banking sector is represented by a single commercial bank, which we loosely refer 
to as the representative bank. The local interbank market will be inessential for 
our analysis. At time 0, the representative bank borrows the amount B in foreign 
currency (say, from the parent bank) at the exogenous foreign interest rate r. The 
bank immediately places B locally, at the interest rate r + si, where si is the spread 36
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that accounts for the default risk premium3 associated with the borrower i = 1, 
2, ..., n. At time 0, the bank selects the set of spreads it charges to its clients, 
{si}i=1, 2, ...n, in order to maximize the expected profit. At the end of the period the 
bank is liquidated and the proceeds are distributed to its shareholders, while the 
individual agents consume their final income. 
There is a single foreign currency and both the bank and the agents can exchange 
it for domestic currency at a single spot exchange rate without a bid-ask spread. 
For simplicity, we also assume that that there is no informational asymmetry 
among market participants, that the foreign exchange rate is exogenous, that 
there are no loans in domestic currency and that domestic currency is in fixed 
supply. Hence, a central bank that would target the domestic currency interest 
rate or intervene in the interbank market is unnecessary for the model, although 
the introduction of a central bank would be the logical next step in our analysis. 
In addition, we assume that there is no secondary market for loans, including 
securitization, in this economy. The latter assumption is quite realistic if we wish 
to apply the model to an emerging economy. 
The model incorporates n distinct agents who act as rational borrowers. We can 
think of them as households or firms, each with its own compensated demand 
for money. At time 0, agent i borrows from the bank the amount bi, denominated 
in the foreign currency, at the interest rate r + si. We assume that initially all 
the borrowers have sufficient payment ability A0,i to qualify for a loan. The total 
foreign-currency amount lent by the bank to the private sector at time 0 is given 
by the sum of individual placements:
.  (1)
Agent i pays the loan back in full only if her final payment ability, expressed 
in the domestic currency, exceeds her liability – that is, if  , 
where X1 is the exchange rate at time 1. Otherwise, the agent defaults and repays 
only the amount A1,i. Following Breuer et al. (2008), we assume that the payment 
ability evolves according to
,  (2)
3  The spread can also account for other premia and margins. We focus our analysis on the 
default-risk aspect of the overall premium.Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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where Yt is the value of GDP at time t = 0, 1, whereas
for any i. The intuition behind the process given by (2) is that the payment ability 
will be higher, on average, during periods of economic growth and lower during 
recessions. The total foreign currency amount repaid at time 1 by agent i is 
therefore
,  (3)
where St,i = At,i / Xt is the payment ability in foreign currency at t = 0, 1, while
,  (4)
is the foreign currency amount due at time 1. The payoff schematic is given in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Possible payments by agent i at time 1.
As a standard assumption, the demand for loans, mi, decreases with the lending 
rate offered by the representative bank. In addition, we assume that it is positively 
correlated with the expected GDP at time 1 expressed in terms of the foreign 38
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currency. We assume that the borrowers at time 0 rationally anticipate GDP at 
time 1, and hence implicitly their expected income at time 1. The borrowers adjust 
their loan demand on the initial date in order to smooth their consumption over 
time. The money demand function manifests the standard Hicksian elements 
whereby it responds positively to expected foreign-currency income and negatively 
to interest rates. In particular,
,  (5)
for every i, with α, β and γ positive (see, for example, Goodhart et al., 2005). 
An agent can invest the amount borrowed in production – directly, in case of 
a company, or indirectly as a stakeholder in case of a household. There are no 
bank deposits available to agents or other investment opportunities. Thus, all the 
borrowings from time 0 are ploughed into production and will be reflected onto 
GDP at time 1. Therefore, in condition (5), the foreign-currency income at time 1 
is entirely captured by Y1 / X1. 
On the other hand, higher credit extension generates a positive real balance 
effect that raises consumption demand and, ultimately, the GDP. Hence, we 
can endogenise GDP by assuming that it is a positive function of the aggregate 
credit supply (expressed in domestic currency), available at the beginning of the 
period:
,  (6)
where
is the exogenous shock to GDP, uncorrelated to all εi. Since we assume that 
domestic currency is in fixed supply, there is no inflation in this economy, and 
hence real and nominal GDP growth will coincide. The absence of inflation is 
not quite realistic, especially in the context of an emerging economy. However, 
introducing a variable supply of domestic currency would not only complicate 
the model, but also make the effects of interaction of exchange rate and default 
risk more difficult to isolate.
The equilibrium in the economy is characterised by a set of interest rate spreads   
{si}i=1, 2, ...n charged by the bank. The representative bank maximizes its expected 
profit Π, which is equal to the expected value of its assets (given by the right-hand Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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side of (3) summed across all the agents) net of the bank’s end-of-period liabilities 
(i.e., the amount that the bank has borrowed abroad,  B, plus the associated 
interest): 
.  (7)
The summand in the expectation on the right hand side of (7) has the same form 
as a payoff of a portfolio consisting of a long position in an asset (in this case, the 
foreign-currency amount that the borrower is able to pay at the end of period) and 
a short position in a call option on this asset. Such payoff structure is common for 
any risky debt (see Merton, 1974). 
The equilibrium is established in the following way. The bank maximises the 
expected future profit by choosing the optimal interest rates (i.e. spreads). When 
the optimal spreads are substituted into (5), we obtain the optimal individual 
loan demands. The corresponding compensated credit demand levels will give 
the borrowers the optimal expected utility levels in equilibrium. Finally, the 
equilibrium total demand and supply of foreign-currency loans have to be equal 
at any given moment:
M = B  (8)
where   is the total demand for loans at the beginning of the period. 
Condition (8) determines the amount of foreign-currency loans initially supplied 
by the bank, B, given by condition (1). 
4. THE SPILLOVER EFFECT
Proposition 1. Agent i defaults at time 1 with probability
.
Here,    is  the  probability  of  default  for  agent  i,    is  the 
cumulative density of a standard normal distribution, while
.  (9)40
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Proposition 1 hence implies that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the exchange 
rate would lead to a decrease in d2,i, which would in turn lead to an increase in 
default probabilities in the economy. The sensitivity of default probability with 
respect to changes in the exchange rate may be substantial. Figure 2 illustrates a 
generic case where the foreign currency is allowed to appreciate or depreciate by 
20 percent, while the loan amount and interest rate spreads are fixed. The figure 
shows the probability of default, PDi, relative to the baseline case, in which there 
are no changes in the exchange rate or GDP. The corresponding probability of 
default is labelled by PD0
i.
Figure 2. Behaviour of the probability of default as a function of exchange rate.
Proposition 1 implies two important results, summarized in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 2. A decrease in the expected growth rate of GDP leads to an increase 
in default probabilities. 
Proposition  3.  If  ,  an  increase  in  the  interest  rate  spread  charged  to 
borrower i leads to a higher default probability PDi. Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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A combination of the effects described in Propositions 2 and 3 may lead to a 
substantial fragility of the financial system. In fact, we will show that for such a 
combination to arise it is sufficient to have a depreciation of local currency.
Proposition 4. The maximand in (7) can be written as
,  (10)
where
  (11)
and d2,i is given by (9). 
Using  Proposition  4,  the  term  in  the  bracket  in  (10)  has  the  following 
interpretation. 
The expression 
,
can be interpreted as the foreign-currency equivalent of the expected payment 
ability of agent i, in the case that he defaults by the end of the period. Similarly, 
using Proposition 1, the second term in the bracket in (10) can be written as
.
This is the face value of the loan if fully recovered, multiplied by the survival 
probability (cf. Figure 1).42
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Proposition 5. The first-order condition for the optimization problem in (6) is 
given by
  (12)
for all i, where   is the probability density function of a standard normal 
random variable. 
Equation (12) determines the set of optimal spreads {si}i=1, 2, ...n that the bank 
charges to the borrowers in equilibrium, provided that its left-hand side has a 
real zero. Given that the equation (12) does not allow for a closed-form solution 
for optimal spreads  , the system of equations has to be solved numerically. 
To analyze the equilibrium, we fix the model parameters in the following way. 
The annualized interbank rate is set to 5%, i.e. r = 0.05. The annual volatilities 
are σA = 0.2 for the payment ability and σY = 0.04 for the GDP growth rate. The 
money demand function has the parameters α = 0.1, β = 0.5 and γ = 0.8, while the 
parameters in the condition (6) that determines the rate of endogenous growth 
are set to φ0 = 0, and φ1 = 0.1. We focus on an individual borrower whose initial 
payment ability (when the loan was granted) was 10 percent above the borrowed 
amount, i.e. S0,i = 1.1bi, and investigate the effect of appreciation or depreciation 
of the foreign currency with respect to the domestic one. The equilibrium is 
obtained by simultaneous numerical solving of (4), (5), (6), (8) and (12) using the 
Brent algorithm.4 
4  The Brent (1973) algorithm uses the combination of bisection, secant, and inverse quadratic 
interpolation methods.Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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Figure 3.   Behaviour of the equilibrium total supply of credit as a function of 
exchange rate.
Figure 3 illustrates the behaviour of the equilibrium total supply of credit as a 
function of the exchange rate. Relative to the case when there is no change in the 
exchange rate, X1 = X0, the total supply of credit increases when foreign currency 
depreciates, and vice-versa. The intuition is rather simple: a higher exchange 
rate implies higher optimal spread, and hence lower equilibrium demand for 
credit. Thus, with a higher exchange rate the local currency becomes cheap and 
consequently the foreign-currency loan becomes more difficult to afford. 
A decrease in credit supply in the economy feeds backs negatively into the GDP 
through condition (6). This leads to reduction of growth. Figure 4 displays the 
principal outcome of the feedback effect: if the foreign currency appreciation 
is significant, the expected growth rate can become negative for the particular 
choice of parameters. If in addition the economy is in a downturn, which will be 
the case for an interval of realisations of the variable η in condition (6), the effect 
is even stronger. 44
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Figure 4.   Behaviour of the equilibrium GDP growth rate as a function of exchange 
rate.
Thus, a spillover of the exchange-rate risk into default risk works in the following 
way. First, the exchange-rate risk increases the default risk of a foreign currency 
borrower directly, through the optionality embedded in the payoff structure of a 
foreign-currency risky debt, as given by (3). This is a first-order effect that would 
exist even if the GDP were assumed to be exogenous, as in Breuer et al. (2008). 
Next, higher default risk implies higher interest rates, combined with a lower 
aggregate credit supply. This credit contraction leads to a negative effect on future 
growth, condition (6), which in turn reduces the credit demand today through 
a rational expectation of borrowers. As a result, the equilibrium supply of credit 
will be further reduced, which creates a circle of negative feedback, see Figure 5. 
The economy ends up in an equilibrium in which the growth may slow down or 
decrease substantially. Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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Figure 5. Schematic representation of the spillover effect.
We can illustrate the importance of the spillover effect using actual data. Consider, 
for example, the case of Serbia, where around 65 percent of loans to retail and the 
corporate sector were indexed to a foreign currency in 2008 (National Bank of 
Serbia, 2009). The Serbian Dinar (RSD), depreciated from 77.09 RSD/EUR on 
September 1, 2008, to 95.46 RSD/EUR on March 31, 2009. This corresponds to 
24% appreciation of the Euro with respect to the Dinar, or, using notation of the 
model, X1/X0 = 1.24. As the baseline scenario, we will assume the absence of any 
interaction of currency and credit risk, fixed supply of Euro-denominated credits, 
and the GDP growth rate equal to zero. The latter assumption would correspond 
to a stagnation, which might have seemed plausible in September 2008, when 
the true repercussions of the global economic crisis were still unforeseen. In 
comparison, when the interaction of exchange rate and credit risk is included, 
the equilibrium outcome becomes quite different. If parameter values are set to r 
= 0.05, σA = 0.2, σY = 0.04, α = 0, β = 0.68, γ = 0.8, φ0 = 0, φ1 = 0.1, and S0,i = 1.1bi, 
the numerical solution of the system of equations given by (4), (5), (6), (8) and (12) 
shows that the equilibrium supply of credit decreases by about 18%, while the 
annualized GDP growth rate drops from 0 to about –4%. Hence, the impact of 
the spillover effect on economic activity may be substantial.
5. PRACTICAL AND REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
The implications of our findings described in Section 3 raise important issues 
for financial institutions as well as their regulators. These issues are of particular 
significance for financial systems in Emerging Europe, where foreign banks are 
dominant market players and where a significant fraction of loans is denominated 
in or indexed to a foreign currency. In this section, we discuss possible strategies 
that commercial and central banks might adopt in order to mitigate the spillover 
effect. 46
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First, the banking sector needs to consider the alternatives to foreign-currency 
indexing. For example, one way for the banks to be hedged against the combined 
exchange rate and credit risk is to denominate their loans in domestic currency, 
but to tie the interest payments to the consumer price index (CPI). This solution 
would be a natural substitute for foreign-currency indexing in import-oriented 
countries (unless, of course, the exchange rate is not in a fixed regime). In such 
economies, inflation is typically positively correlated with the exchange rate. 
We see at least two reasons why commercial banks in emerging markets rarely 
resort to CPI indexing in practice. Firstly, exchange rates are established on a 
daily basis and always involve some market mechanisms. The official CPI data, 
on the other hand, are published by government-sponsored statistical offices 
once every month, and usually with a lag. Secondly, CPI is often calculated using 
a methodology that is arguably not the most appropriate one to represent the 
prevailing payment abilities of the borrowers.
An alternative for banks is to maintain the foreign-currency indexing of their 
credits, but to use combined hedging mechanisms. This, for instance, may include 
hedging with exchange rate and credit derivatives, achieved through combined 
positions in currency forwards or swaps and credit default swaps.5
On the other hand, a possible regulatory response to prevent the spillover of market 
into credit risk is to manipulate the obligatory reserve requirements. In order to 
cushion the effect, the central bank has to provide an incentive for commercial 
banks to either increase their supply of foreign currency-denominated credit or 
decrease the interest rates they charge for such placements. If the exchange rate in 
question is in a floating or managed floating regime, one way to provide such an 
incentive is to reduce the required reserves for the foreign currency placements 
whenever  the  exchange  rate  increases  significantly.  This  effectively  decreases 
the regulatory costs for banks, which leaves them the opportunity to reduce 
the spreads in order to be more competitive while remaining profitable. Lower 
interest rates on foreign-currency loans should then lead to a higher demand for 
credit. In the framework of our model, the reduction of reserve requirements 
results in equilibrium where the credit supply and GDP growth rate are higher, 
probabilities of default are lower, while the bank retains optimum level of the 
expected profit.6 
5  Unlike market risk, the hedging of credit risk with derivatives is more complex. For instance, 
in Optimum whatse2008 during the financial crisis, AIG could not recover any of the short 
positions on credit default swaps they held as a credit risk hedge. 
6  Strictly  speaking,  in  our  model  regulatory  costs  are  not  explicitly  taken  into  account. 
However, the reduction of obligatory reserve requirements for foreign currency-denominated 
placements will have the same effect as if the bank’s cost of capital r is reduced. Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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The  Global  Financial  Stability  Report  (International  Monetary  Fund,  2009) 
shows that from the end of 2007 credit growth declined continuously in Europe, 
where many countries are heavily reliant on cross-border funding which became 
scarce during the crisis. On the other hand, in Latin America and Asia (excluding 
China) bank credit growth stabilized in the second half of 2009, suggesting that 
policy actions have been successful in halting the downward spiral in financial 
conditions. 
An alternative solution for central banks is related to an improvement in the 
way in which regulatory capital is determined. Regulatory standards, such as 
those proposed by the Basel Committee, are based on the traditional approach, 
where the implicit assumption is that market and credit risks are independent. 
This view parallels the customary organization of bank departments, which are 
often impermeable to each other. Consequently, procedures for regulatory capital 
calculations, such as those based on Pillar 1 of the Basel II Accord, treat credit and 
market risk separately.7 As a result, the overall regulatory capital is simply the sum 
of regulatory capitals for credit, market and operational risks. The conventional 
wisdom  is  that  such  regulatory  standards  are  always  conservative,  since  the 
measure of total portfolio risk should be smaller than – or at most equal to – the 
sum of individual risk measures. This belief is a natural consequence of the fact 
that the current regulatory framework is based on the Value-at-Risk (VaR) logic. 
In spite of being established as a de-facto industry as well as regulatory standard, 
VaR is often criticized for not being a coherent risk measure.8 For example, for two 
sources of risk, X and Y, there might be situations in which VaR(X + Y) > VaR(X) 
+ VaR(Y).9 In practice, however, banks’ assets are simultaneously sensitive to both 
market and credit risk factors. Hence, any change in value of the total portfolio 
that is separated into a pure-market and a pure-credit risk change may lead to an 
underestimation of the total risk. This is the case whenever market and credit risk 
factors exhibit a positive non-linear co-dependence or whenever they are driven 
by other, common, risk factors in a non-linear fashion. The negative feedback 
described in Section 3 clearly reinforces the necessity for a careful treatment of 
market risk in the banking book. 
7  Some forms of market risk in the banking book, such as exchange rate and interest rate risk, 
do carry additional capital charges under Pillar 2 of Basel II.
8  Furthermore, VaR completely ignores statistical properties of losses beyond the specified 
quantile of the profit-loss distribution, i.e. the tail risk.
9  Examples of such non-subadditivity of VaR can be found in Artzner et al. (1997, 1999), Acerbi 
and Tasche (2002) and Breuer et al. (2008).48
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6. CONCLUSION
This  paper  contributes  to  the  ongoing  challenge  of  the  traditional  banking 
approach of dividing market and credit risk. When portfolio positions depend 
simultaneously on market and credit risk factors, the nature of the problem 
changes. Foreign currency loans are a good example where the conventional 
additivity of risk measures is violated in a potentially dangerous way. In fact, this 
paper shows that the probability of default of a foreign-currency borrower may 
increase significantly when the local currency depreciates. In this case, the peril 
is in fact twofold. First, the non-linear nature of payoffs in a risky debt leads to 
a positive non-linear co-dependence between the two risk factors. Second, in an 
economy where GDP is endogenous, the increased default risk reduces the total 
supply of credit. This creates a negative feedback and leads to a higher default risk 
through reduced payment ability in the future, that is, a spillover of the exchange-
rate risk into default risk. In sum, when the domestic currency depreciates, the 
rational expectations equilibrium is characterized by a higher default probability, 
reduced credit supply and reduced growth, compared to the equilibrium resulting 
from a stable exchange rate. 
Our results reinforce the notion that an appropriate risk measure must integrate 
exchange-rate risk with credit risk. There are mechanisms that market participants 
and regulators can adopt in order to reduce the negative effects of the spillover 
of one type of risk into another. In addition, development of a fully integrated 
approach to risk assessment and mitigation will certainly be of great help to 
financial institutions in future crises.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
Probability of default for agent i can be written as the probability that her payment 
ability at time 1 is lower than the face value of debt (both in local currency):
Using (2) and then (6) we obtain
The random variable η+εi  is distributed normally, with an expected value of   
–σ2
A/2 and a variance of σ2
A + σ2
Y. Hence,
where zi is a standard normal random variable. This finally gives
where d2,i is defined by (9).      ♦52
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let
be the expected growth rate of GDP. Using Proposition 1 and formula (9), we 
find
  (A1)
where    is  the  probability  density  function  of  a  standard  normal  random 
variable. In other words, all default probabilities increase when GDP growth rate 
decreases, and vice-versa.       ♦
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let
be the expected growth rate of GDP. Using (6), we can write it as
  (A2)
Next, note that in equilibrium
  (A3)Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
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where the equalities follow from (8) and (5). Combining (A2) and (A3), and then 
solving explicitly for the equilibrium growth rate, we obtain
  (A4)
This implies 
.  (A5)
Therefore, (A1) and (A5) give
If  , the last expression will be positive. In that case, the higher the spread, 
the higher the default probability.       ♦
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
First, note that the expected profit in (7) can be written as
On the other hand, 54
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Using (2) and (7) we can write the above expression as
 
Then, using the distributional assumptions for η and εi, we can calculate the first 
conditional expectation
After completing the squares, we obtain
where d1,i is defined by (11). That is,
.
Similarly, the second conditional expectation can be written as
Putting it all together, we obtain condition (10).      ♦Spillover of Exchange-rate Risk into Default Risk
55
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 
The first-order condition is obtained by setting the partial derivative of (10) with 
respect to every si to zero. This is equivalent to
  (A6)
We can write
where we used (A2). Since γ > 0, (A5) implies that ∂g / ∂si will never be equal to 
zero. A straightforward derivation from (A6) gives 
for all i, which is equivalent to (12).      ♦